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Abstract
Magical thinking is of relevance to obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), and has been most widely investigated in
relation to the cognitive bias known as thought-action fusion (TAF). This is seen as playing a role in the formation of fears
about responsibility for harm. We suggest that magical thinking may also characterise some types of neutralising
behaviour, which arise in response to those fears, and are a hallmark of the disorder. In an experimental study of 51
undergraduate students, we assessed whether the use of neutralising behaviours in response to an induction of fears of
increasing likelihood for harm is related to a propensity for magical thinking. The 75.5% of participants demonstrated at
least one form of neutralising behaviour in response to a TAF-induction task. Neutralising was associated with stronger
and more persistent responses to the task, and with questionnaire measures of magical ideation. Those who neutralised did
not report higher levels of OCD symptoms. It appears that neutralising is a common response in circumstances that
provoke a sense of responsibility for harm. Its occurrence may be linked to magical thinking, however, the results from this
experimental investigation suggested that this process may not be speciﬁc to OCD.
r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Introduction
One of the puzzles of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is the way that sufferers may focus on events
that are not only improbable, but also implausible. Clients may have an impulse to check they have not run
down a pedestrian whilst driving, even if they have not actually seen anyone walking at the side of the road, or
they may fear an aircraft will crash merely because the thought of it has entered their head. The event is
implausible, because no reasonable connection exists between the feared outcome and its supposed cause.
Connections of this type, where thoughts and external events are linked in a way that cannot be rationally
explained by physical laws or culturally acceptable explanations, are known as magical thinking.
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Furthermore, some common neutralising rituals also appear to have a symbolic or magical element. These
include counting, repeating meaningless phrases, positioning objects, and completing actions with a particular
gesture. Each may be believed to offer protection, despite an objective irrelevance to the feared event.
Therefore, magical thinking is not only present on the ‘input’ side of OCD (i.e. in creating a sense of threat),
but is even more widely seen in the ‘output’, namely the forms of neutralising behaviour which arise in
response to that threat. This is supported by a number of recent questionnaire-based studies that have
suggested that magical thinking may be related to both obsessions and harm avoidance behaviour in OCD
(Einstein & Menzies, 2004a, 2004b, 2006; Amir et al., 2001). The present study uses an experimental paradigm
to investigate links between magical thinking and responsibility for harm and consequent neutralising
behaviour.
Neutralising behaviour in OCD
Freeston and Ladouceur (1997) deﬁne neutralising as ‘‘a voluntary, effortful cognitive or behavioural act
that is directed at removing, preventing and attenuating the intrusive thought and the associated discomfort’’
(Freeston and Ladouceur, 1997, p. 344). There is a general consensus in cognitive theory that this behaviour
plays an important role in maintaining intrusive thoughts in OCD, and it is hypothesised that neutralising
activities are safety seeking behaviours that are connected to the subjective meaning of the intrusive thought.
Thus, individuals with OCD engage in neutralising behaviour as they believe it to be able to prevent the
consequence foreseen by the thought’s content in some causal way (Rachman and de Silva, 1978; Freeston and
Ladouceur, 1997). Where those consequences related to the intrusive thought cannot be altered, it is suggested
that neutralising is used to at least discharge what the person believes is their responsibility (Salkovskis et al.,
2003). Neutralisation is distinguished from general coping responses to intrusive thoughts; general coping
responses are considered to be less speciﬁc and concerned with addressing the thought’s presence and any
associated discomfort rather than its actual content (Freeston and Ladouceur, 1997). In some cases
neutralising may involve activity whose link to the consequences of the intrusion seems to operate at a
symbolic level. For example, a fear of being responsible for harm to a child might be neutralised via counting
in ﬁxed sequences, rather than through any direct physical action to protect the child. A neutralising strategy
that is not rationally connected to the consequence it aims to inﬂuence can be deﬁned as magical thinking.
Thought-action fusion and magical thinking
Thought-action fusion (TAF; Rachman, 1993) is a speciﬁc form of magical thinking (Amir et al., 2001,
Einstein & Menzies, 2004a, 2004b, 2006) which has been suggested as a cognitive bias that could contribute to
the catastrophic misinterpretation of intrusive thoughts in OCD. The most researched form is TAF-likelihood,
which refers to the belief that having a thought about an unacceptable or disturbing event makes it more likely
to happen in reality. TAF-likelihood has been demonstrated to relate to OCD (Amir et al., 2001; Shafran
et al., 1996), exacerbate intrusive thoughts (Rassin et al., 1999), and may even be a precursor of OCD (Rassin
et al., 2000).
Magical thinking is usually deﬁned more broadly than TAF alone, being characterised by attributions
about causality that defy eit er physical laws or culturally accepted explanations. Typically, real-life events
are seen as being caused by a person’s thought, or by actions, which are physically unconnected to the
events (Zusne and Jones, 1989). Research on magical thinking has mainly focused on links between OCD
and schizotypy (Lee et al., 2005; Norman et al., 1996; Sobin et al., 2000; Tolin et al., 2001) though some
studies directly explore its relevance in OCD (Bolton et al., 2002; Emmelkamp and Aardema, 1999; Muris and
Merckelbach, 2003). Unlike TAF, magical thinking is not constrained to apply only to negative and untoward
events but may also be involved in harm avoidance behaviour.
Investigating magical thinking in neutralising behaviour
The question of whether magical thinking generates neutralising behaviour is as yet unresolved. Data in this
area is unconvincing, partly because the majority of research relies on self-report methods. It is difﬁcult to
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produce reliable and replicable demonstrations of unusual phenomena in experimental settings (de Silva et al.,
2003), and this is particularly problematic with research into magical thinking, because even when magical
beliefs are demonstrated in a participant’s behaviour, they are seldom reported (Subbotsky, 2001). This may
arise because participants feel they should show rational and logical thinking (Subbotsky, 2004).
Experimental studies that investigate participants’ behaviour are therefore preferable to those that rely on
verbal report when assessing the role of magical thinking. Such methodologies have been lacking, but
Rachman and colleagues developed a paradigm to induce TAF-likelihood and enable the study of obsessive
neutralising (Rachman et al., 1996). Participants write out and visualise the sentence ‘‘I hope X is in a car
accident’’ where X refers to a close friend or relative. Using a high-TAF sample of non-clinical participants,
Rachman et al. (1996) demonstrated that in response to this task, participant’s anxiety increased and they
reported an urge to neutralise. Those who were instructed to neutralise demonstrated an immediate decrease
in anxiety, whereas anxiety in the control group reduced over a longer time course. The authors concluded
that the results paralleled the experimental effect of exposure and response prevention with overt compulsive
behaviour, and that the paradigm might provide a valid means of investigating OCD behaviour in an analogue
population. Using the same paradigm in a high-TAF analogue sample, 63% of participants demonstrated at
least one example of spontaneous neutralising behaviour in response to the induction (Zucker et al., 2002).
The paradigm has also been used with an unselected sample, and a similar pattern for anxiety and urge to
neutralise was demonstrated. It is unclear whether TAF questionnaire scores relate to TAF-induction effects,
as contradictory results have been reported (van den Hout et al., 2002, van den Hout et al., 2001).
The Rachman et al. (1996) paradigm offers an opportunity to test whether neutralising behaviours,
performed in response to fears of responsibility for harm, are associated with magical thinking and OCD
symptoms. The present study hypothesises that in a non-clinical sample, some individuals will demonstrate
neutralising behaviours in response to TAF-induction. We will explore the nature of these behaviours, and
whether, during the task, the increase in anxiety and urge to neutralise is associated with the person’s level of
magical thinking, TAF-likelihood, and/or OCD symptoms. Furthermore, as magical strategies are thought to
be associated with harm avoidance behaviour, we hypothesise that those people who use neutralising strategies
will show more magical thinking, TAF-likelihood, and symptoms of OCD than those who do not neutralise.
Finally, we will assess whether there is a difference between the task-speciﬁc beliefs of people who use
neutralising strategies and those who do not.
Method
Participants
The 51 participants, 5 male and 46 female, completed the measures. All participants were undergraduate
psychology students at the University of Southampton and received course credits in return for their
participation in the study. Two participants were excluded from the study on the basis of exclusion criteria.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 38 years, the mean age of the sample was 20.7 years ðSD ¼ 4:3Þ.
Measures
Thought-action fusion scale-revised (TAFS; Shafran et al., 1996)
This 19-item self-report measures is reported to have good internal consistency for both student and
‘obsessional’ samples (with Chronbach’s alpha co-efﬁcients of .92 and .95–.96, respectively; Shafran et al.,
1996; Rassin et al., 2001; Rassin et al., 2001; Yorulmaz et al., 2004). Each item is rated on a 5-point scale
ranging from 0 (disagree strongly) to 4 (agree strongly). No items are reverse scored. Although it has three
subscales (TAF-moral, TAF-likelihood pertaining to others, and TAF-likelihood for oneself) a principal
components analysis has suggested a two-factor solution for the TAFS; the two factors being moral and
likelihood TAF (a composite score of TAF-likelihood for self and for others subscales) (Shafran et al., 1996;
Lee et al., 2005; Rassin, Diepstraten et al., 2001; Rassin, Merckelbach et al., 2001; Yorulmaz et al., 2004). This
study bases analyses on the two-factor model.
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Magical ideation scale (MIS; Eckblad & Chapman, 1983)
This consists of 30 dichotomous true-false items exploring magical beliefs based on a deﬁnition of magical
thinking as ‘belief in forms of causation that by conventional standards are invalid’. The scale was originally
developed with a normative sample to assess magical ideation in schizotypy (Eckblad and Chapman, 1983)
and has been demonstrated to show construct validity as a measure of schizotypy. It is reported to have good
internal consistency with coefﬁcients ranging from .82 to .87 (Tolin et al., 2001; Norman et al., 1996). With
normal samples highly skewed scores on the MIS are reported (Eckblad and Chapman, 1983), and there are
mixed ﬁndings on its ability to distinguish individuals with OCD from those with other anxiety disorders
(Bentall et al., 1989; Enright and Beech, 1990; Enright et al., 1993), but it has been the most common measure
in research on magical thinking in OCD to date (Einstein & Menzies, 2004a, 2004b).
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Speilberger et al., 1983)
This 40 item self-report measure of state and trait anxiety has been demonstrated to show good internal
consistency on student samples with a Cronbach’s alpha coefﬁcient of .92 (Ramanaiah et al., 1983). This study
employed only the trait version, which consists of 20 items assessing trait anxiety, on a 4-point likert scale
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so).
Padua Inventory Washington State University revised edition (PI-R; Burns et al., 1996)
This revision of the original Padua Inventory (PI; Sanavio, 1988) was speciﬁcally selected as it is designed to
reduce overlap with worry and organises 39 of the 60 items of the original PI into ﬁve content categories
relevant to obsessions and compulsions, namely: (1) obsessional thoughts about harm to oneself or others; (2)
obsessional impulses to harm oneself or others; (3) contamination obsessions and washing compulsions; (4)
checking compulsions; and (5) dressing/grooming compulsions. The original validation of this revised scale on
a non-clinical sample demonstrated a high level of internal consistency on the 5 subscales (Cronbach’s alpha of
.77–.88) with the alpha value for the total scale being .92.
Visual analogue scales (VAS)
In addition to questionnaire measures, 150mm visual analogue Scales (VAS) were adopted to measure
short-term ﬂuctuations of mood and estimates of the nature and intensity of experienced mental states. Each
VAS referred to a statement and participant’s marked the degree they endorsed each statement by marking the
line between the 0% and 100% ‘anchors’ at either end of the scale. Scores were converted into percentage
ratings. The statements measured by the VAS referred to the following variables: (1) the sense of moral
wrongness about writing out the sentence, (2) perceptions of likelihood of harm arising as a consequence of
thoughts, (3) distress, (4) responsibility for consequences, (5) urge to cancel thoughts, and (6) state anxiety. All
VAS were completed following TAF-induction task and following an opportunity to neutralise. A VAS
measure of state anxiety was also taken prior to the TAF-induction task.
Manipulation checks were used to ensure that participants engaged in the TAF induction. These checks
were used where individuals rated their distress score on the VAS measure post-TAF induction as less than
50%. Such individuals were excluded if they then gave VAS ratings for ‘seriousness of accident imagined’ as
less than 50%, as it was assumed that they had not fully engaged with the paradigm if they were not distressed
and had also not imagined a serious accident. A threshold value on 50% was adopted on the VAS, following
the suggestion of Rachman et al. (1996). One participant was excluded from the analysis of the results for this
reason.
Procedure
The experimental protocol was ratiﬁed by the University of Southampton ethics committee, and was
conducted in small groups (mode ¼ 3 participants). Participants ﬁrst completed the questionnaire measures:
TAFS, MIS, PI-R, STAI. The experimenter then read the instructions for the experimental procedure from a
script. This procedure used was based on the original paradigm of Rachman et al. (1996). Participants were
ﬁrst asked to rate their initial level of state anxiety on a VAS before being provided with a single written
sentence intended to evoke TAF-likelihood that read ‘I hope ___________ is in a car accident’. They were
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instructed to write the name of someone close to them into the sentence and then copy out the sentence before
visualising the situation depicted in the sentence. Detailed modiﬁcations were made to the original procedure,
including verbal prompts to encourage clear and vivid visualisation of the scene over a period of 30 s. As in the
original experiment a 2-minute period followed the visualisation of the sentence and completion of VAS. Here,
however, participants were told that they did not have to do anything during that time, but if they did wish to
do something, it could be anything, and could involve the sheet of paper. This was intended to ensure only
spontaneous reactions were elicited. Finally, participants recorded any coping behaviour they had used within
that 2min period. Participant’s were debriefed at the end of the experiment as to the nature of the experiment
and were provided with information about TAF-likelihood. Following the debrief each participant was
checked for the levels of distress about the experimental procedure, and time was provided by the
experimenter to discuss any remaining concerns that participant’s held about the experimental procedure on
an individual basis. The experimenter also provided contact details should participants encounter any future
distress related to the experimental protocol. No participants reported elevated levels of distress following
debrief and none used the telephone contact.
Results
Statistical analyses
SPSS version 12 was used for all quantitative analysis. Data from questionnaire measures were tested for
normality with the Kolmogorov–Smirnov statistic. The scores for the MIS, PI-total score, STAI-trait were not
normally distributed, however, square-root transformations normalised the data for all scores. The normal
distribution of the TAF-likelihood scores allowed for parametric analysis. The majority of VAS scores were
not normally distributed and transformations to the data did not restore normality, so non-parametric
statistics were applied with the VAS data throughout. The means and standard deviations for the raw and
transformed questionnaire data are shown in Table 1.
Effects of the TAF paradigm
Subjective effects
The ﬁrst analysis tested out the hypothesis that the TAF-induction paradigm would model the level of
anxiety and urge to neutralise that is seen OCD within the non-selected sample. A Friedman’s test indicated
that there were signiﬁcant differences between the level of anxiety at baseline, post-TAF induction and post-
neutralisation opportunity (w2F ¼ 78:533, df ¼ 2, p ¼ :000, n ¼ 49) for all participants. Post-hoc Wilcoxon
Signed Ranks tests, with Bonferroni corrected alpha level .01 indicated that anxiety signiﬁcantly increased
from baseline to post-TAF induction (Z ¼ 6:083, p ¼ :000, two-tailed test, n ¼ 49), and then signiﬁcantly
decreased after an opportunity to neutralise (Z ¼ 5:322, p ¼ :000, n ¼ 49). However, the level of anxiety
remained signiﬁcantly greater post-neutralising opportunity than at baseline (Z ¼ 5:360, p ¼ :000, two-
tailed test, n ¼ 49). A Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test also indicated that there was a signiﬁcant decline in the urge
to neutralise following the neutralising opportunity (Z ¼ 5:695, p ¼ :000, two-tailed test, n ¼ 49).
Given that the paradigm produced an increase in anxiety and an urge to neutralise, we next tested the
hypothesis that the anxiety level and change in the urge to neutralise were associated with levels of magical
thinking, TAF or OCD-symptoms. Using a less conservative uncorrected alpha .05 there were no signiﬁcant
correlations between any of the questionnaire measures of magical thinking, TAF-likelihood, or OCD
symptoms and the increase in anxiety from baseline to immediately after writing and visualising the sentence
(TAFS-moral: rs ¼ :07; TAFS-likelihood: rs ¼ :12; MIS: rs ¼ :04; PI: rs ¼ :06). Following the
opportunity to neutralise, there were no signiﬁcant correlations between any of the questionnaire scores
and the drop in anxiety (TAFS-moral: rs ¼ :07; TAFS-likelihood: rs ¼ :02; MIS: rs ¼ :07; PI: rs ¼ :11) or the
drop in the urge to neutralise (TAFS-moral: rs ¼ :15; TAFS-likelihood: rs ¼ :10; MIS: rs ¼ :22; PI:
rs ¼ :15).
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Behavioural effects (neutralising)
The experimenters hypothesised that in a non-clinical sample some individuals will demonstrate neutralising
behaviours in response to the TAF-induction. In this sample only one participant did not do anything in
response to the TAF induction. The 48 participants who engaged in neutralising and/or coping behaviours
reported a total of 129 different neutralising and coping strategies. The modal number of strategies used by the
participants was 3. Participants described a range of overt and covert strategies that were used in response to
the TAF-induction, and a simple thematic analysis was applied to these idiosyncratic descriptions as outlined
by Boyatzis (1998). From this analysis 13 classes of strategies emerged and a code for classifying the strategies
was developed. An independent rater then classiﬁed the participant’s responses on the basis of these codes.
This procedure demonstrated an inter-rater reliability of 92.4% for the codes.
To test the hypotheses that individuals who neutralise will show more magical thinking, TAF-likelihood,
and symptoms of OCD than those who do not neutralise, individuals were ﬁrst identiﬁed as ‘neutralisers’ or
‘non-neutralisers’ according to Freeston and Ladouceur’s (1997) deﬁnition of neutralising behaviour. This
deﬁnition was applied to the overt and covert strategies that were recorded by participants, and the strategies
were considered to be spontaneous neutralising behaviour if the behaviour (1) did not connect to the intrusive
thought in a manner explained by normal causation and (2) could not be accounted for by a normal coping
response (Freeston and Ladouceur, 1997). This deﬁnition was applied to the classiﬁcation categories by the
experimenters (Table 2). Several strategies were classiﬁed as ambiguous as the experimenters were unsure of
the motivations underpinning them (strategies 10–14).
75.5% of participants used at least one strategy in response to writing out and visualising the sentence that could
be classiﬁed as neutralising. These individuals were ascribed to a neutralising group, and individuals using other
coping responses (including ambiguous responses) or no response were ascribed to a non-neutralising group. The
modal number of strategies used by the neutralising and non-neutralising groups was 3 and 1, respectively.
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Table 1
Mean and standard deviation for raw and transformed scores for measures
Measure ðn ¼ 49Þ M (raw) SD (raw) M (transformed) SD (transformed)
MISa 6.73 4.67 2.40 1.0
TAFS-moral 20.86 8.22 4.44 1.07
TAFS-likelihood 6.34 5.60 2.31 1.53
PI-R-total 17.67 11.49 3.98 1.36
STAI trait 42.33 10.50 6.16 .96
VAS measures (%)
VAS anxiety prior to experiment 24.06 20.43
Post-TAF induction
VAS1 anxiety 59.71 20.68
VAS1 wrongness 81.78 22.03
VAS1 likelihood 24.14 24.25
VAS1 distress 82.75 18.08
VAS1 responsibility 63.61 31.05
VAS1 cancelling urge 72.10 27.86
Post-neutralising opportunity
VAS2 anxiety 43.61 17.81
VAS2 wrongness 76.18 27.68
VAS2 likelihood 20.62 19.26
VAS2 distress 72.56 21.38
VAS2 responsibility 51.74 32.68
VAS2 cancelling urge 47.48 33.61
VAS2 reduction in likelihood 31.99 24.10
Note: MIS: magical ideation scale; TAFS-moral: thought-action fusion scale (TAFS)-moral subscale; TAFS-likelihood: TAFS-likelihood
subscale; PI-R: Padua Inventory revised; STAI-trait: State Trait Anxiety Inventory- trait version; VAS: visual analogue scale.
aDue to missing data n ¼ 48 for this scale.
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It was predicted that participants who showed spontaneous neutralising would demonstrate more magical
thinking, TAF-likelihood and OCD symptoms than those who do not neutralise. The mean and standard
deviations for the scores on these measures for each group are shown in Table 3.
T-tests were used to examine for signiﬁcant differences between the two groups. The neutralising group
demonstrated signiﬁcantly greater scores on the MIS, tð46Þ ¼ 2:63, p ¼ :011 (two-tailed test), and TAFS-
Likelihood, tð47Þ ¼ 2:12, p ¼ :039 (two-tailed test). No signiﬁcant differences were found between the two
groups for OCD symptoms, nor for TAFS-moral, depression, or trait anxiety.
Finally, group differences were examined in respect of task speciﬁc beliefs, elicited by the TAF-induction
task. Using Mann Whitney U-tests of differences in the ratings on the VAS prior to neutralisation, we found
that signiﬁcantly greater scores were reported by the neutralising group for ratings of likelihood (U ¼ 105:0,
p ¼ :006, two-tailed, n ¼ 49), distress (U ¼ 115:0, p ¼ :012, two-tailed, n ¼ 49), responsibility (U ¼ 97:0,
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Table 2
Strategies used post-TAF induction in response to the TAF induction stimulus
Strategy Proportion of overall
strategies used (%)
No. of participants using
this strategy ðn ¼ 49Þ
(a) Spontaneous neutralising strategies
1. Do something to destroy the sentence on the paper 25.6 26
2. Alter the sentence to change the meaning 10.9 13
3. Visualise the/an accident, but with a less serious/positive outcome 7.0 8
4. Do something to destroy the visualised image 2.3 3
5. Superstitious act 1.6 2
(b) Other coping strategies
6. Rationalise about writing out the sentence 9.3 10
7. Clear minding mind/distraction 3.9 5
8. Relaxation techniques 0.8 1
9. Plan to do something following experiment for reassurance 0.8 1
(c) Ambiguous strategies
10. Imagine the person involved in the accident as okay 16.3 20
11. Unclassiﬁable 15.5 14
12. Do something so no longer look at the sentence without destroying the
sentence
3.9 5
13. Religious strategy 1.5 2
14. Do nothing 0.8 1
Table 3
Comparison of the raw and transformed scores for the neutralising and non-neutralising groups on all measures prior to neutralisation
Neutralisers ðn ¼ 37Þ Non-neutralisers ðn ¼ 12Þ
Raw scores Transformed Raw scores Transformed
M SD M SD M SD M SD
MISa** 7.7 4.7 2.6 1.0 3.9 3.5 1.8 .9
TAFS-moral 22.0 7.2 4.6 .8 17.4 10.4 3.9 1.5
TAFS-likelihoodb 8.8 7.2 2.6 1.5 2.9 2.6 1.5 1.4
STAI-trait 43.3 10.9 6.5 .8 39.4 8.8 6.1 .9
PI-R total 18.8 11.7 4.1 1.4 14.1 10.6 3.5 1.3
Note: MIS: magical ideation scale; TAFS-moral: thought-action fusion scale (TAFS)-moral subscale; TAFS-likelihood: TAFS-likelihood
subscale; STAI trait: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-trait version; PI-R: revised Padua Inventory.
aDue to missing data, n ¼ 36 in the non-neutralising group.
bApproaching signiﬁcance at po:05.
**po:01.
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p ¼ :004, two-tailed, n ¼ 49) and urge to cancel (U ¼ 100:0, p ¼ :002, two-tailed, N ¼ 50). At an alpha level of
.05 no signiﬁcant differences were found between the ratings for anxiety or the wrongness of writing the
sentence.
Two-tailed Wilcoxon tests demonstrated that following the neutralising opportunity both the neutralising
and non-neutralising group demonstrated a signiﬁcant reduction in anxiety (neutralising: Z ¼ 4:798,
p ¼ :000, n ¼ 37; non-neutralising: Z ¼ 2:510, p ¼ :012, n ¼ 13; two-tailed tests). Both groups also
demonstrated a signiﬁcant reduction in the urge to do something to cancel out the effect of the sentence
(neutralising: Z ¼ 4:994, p ¼ :000, n ¼ 37; non-neutralising: Z ¼ 2:756, p ¼ :006, n ¼ 12).
However, even after the opportunity to neutralise, the neutralising group continued to demonstrate a
signiﬁcantly greater urge to cancel (U ¼ 122:0, p ¼ :02, two-tailed, n ¼ 49) and a greater feeling of
responsibility should an accident occur (U ¼ 112:5, p ¼ :011, two-tailed, n ¼ 49). The neutralising group
continued to rate the likelihood of an accident occurring as greater (U ¼ 107:0, p ¼ :007, two-tailed, n ¼ 49).
There was no signiﬁcant difference on any of the remaining VAS measures.
Discussion
The TAF-induction task appears to have been effective as an experimental manipulation, producing effects
in an unselected group of participants, which were similar to the high TAF sample of Rachman et al. (1996).
Participants demonstrated an increase in anxiety in response to writing out and visualising the sentence, and
the anxiety and urge to cancel out the effect of the sentence reduced after a 2-minute opportunity to engage in
neutralising behaviour or other coping response. TAF-type responses therefore appear to occur in the normal
population. The increase in anxiety and urge to neutralise was not correlated with measures of TAF, OCD or
magical thinking.
The behavioural response data suggests that neutralising is also common within the general popu-
lation. A natural tendency to use neutralisation strategies without instruction was demonstrated by 75.5%
of the sample. The majority of participants used neutralising strategies in conjunction with other
coping responses with only three participants using solely neutralising strategies. The remaining parti-
cipants used either other coping responses or no response to the induction. A large proportion of the normal
sample therefore demonstrated neutralising behaviour in response to TAF-like phenomena, a ﬁnding which
is at odds with the prevailing view (Salkovskis et al., 2003) that neutralising is relatively uncommon except
in OCD.
The people who do neutralise in response to the task show interesting characteristics in contrast to those
who do not. Those who neutralise demonstrate greater ratings for distress, responsibility, urge to cancel the
effects of the sentence, and a greater likelihood of an accident occurring following the TAF-induction. This
would suggest that people who demonstrate more characteristics of ‘fusion’ between thoughts and their
content are more prone to neutralise. The two groups did not differ in the perceived moral wrongness of
writing out the sentence, or levels of anxiety induced by the experimental procedure.
The neutralising group also seem to have a greater duration of response to the TAF induction, despite (or
perhaps even because of) the chance to neutralise, though the groups did not differ with respect to initial levels
of anxiety. After the opportunity to neutralise, both the neutralising and non-neutralising groups
demonstrated signiﬁcant reductions in the ratings for anxiety and urge to cancel the effects of the sentence,
but the neutralising group continued to report a higher likelihood of an accident occurring, increased
responsibility and an increased urge to cancel out the effects of the sentence. The data could be interpreted as
merely showing that neutralising behaviour was ineffective in compensating for writing the sentence, but it
would also support current cognitive theory and clinical investigation (Salkovskis et al., 2003) which suggests
that neutralising functions to increase the persistence of distress. It could be that neutralising increases
preoccupation with the thought, by focussing on the idea of harm and the person’s responsibility for trying to
prevent it. It is interesting that we have been able to demonstrate this effect in a group who do not show
intrusive thoughts, or symptoms of OCD, suggesting that it is neutralising itself that makes this distress
persist, rather than it being a speciﬁc feature of OCD.
The relationship between neutralising behaviour and anxiety was less clear, as the two groups showed no
difference in their level of state anxiety over the course of the experiment. This may be because all the
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strategies used by participants represent coping strategies in response to anxiety. The type of strategy used
may be a result of a participant’s preference to either use magical strategies to attempt to undo the content of
the TAF thought and thereby restore a sense of control over the situation, or it might be a strategy to
ameliorate the emotional response to the TAF, in other words an attempt to use rationalising, distraction or
other coping techniques to reduce their distress associated with TAF. Both would reduce anxiety, whether or
not the magical strategies were akin to neutralising behaviour seen in OCD (Zucker et al., 2002) and had a
restorative or ameliorative function in response to the content of TAF-induction.
Magical thinking appears to be associated with neutralising behaviour. Spontaneous neutralisers
demonstrated a signiﬁcantly greater endorsement of magical thinking. This supports the reported association
between neutralising and TAF-likelihood reported previously (van den Hout et al., 2002). However, there was
no difference on the scores of the PI-R suggesting that the neutralisers and non-neutralisers did not differ in
OCD symptomatology. The two groups also did not differ in their level of TAF-moral, or trait anxiety. It
would appear then that magical thinking alone is associated with the use of a neutralising behaviour in
response to intrusive thoughts. This supports Amir et al.’s (2001) conclusion that the fusion of thoughts and
actions may be more general and not only associated with cognitive biases in OCD.
A limitation of the experimental design was the failure to record details of participant’s moti-
vations for using speciﬁc strategies in response to the induction, which was a particular problem with the
‘ambiguous’ strategies. The classiﬁcation system had a high inter-rater reliability but was simply a
topographical description of the behaviours demonstrated. An improved experimental design would
record the participant’s motivation for the behaviours performed. In view of the difﬁculties of self
report of magical thinking (Subbotsky, 2001, 2004) this may be problematic, but without fuller knowledge
of the motivations involved, the classiﬁcation of ‘neutralising’ and ‘non-neutralising’ strategies based
upon the Freeston and Ladouceur (1997) deﬁnition involves some assumptions being made. There could be
errors in assuming that behaviours classiﬁed as ‘neutralising’ were either (1) not connected to the in-
trusive thought in a manner explicable by normal causation, and/or (2) could not be accounted for
by a normal coping response. Further, independent raters were not used at this stage, which is a
methodological shortcoming. The materials involved in the experiment were also limited, so it is possible that
participants felt that there were few potential ways of responding to the TAF induction sentence, and engaged
in neutralising type actions in response to the perceived demand characteristics of the experiment. Further
research is necessary to determine whether different motivations underpin neutralising and other coping
strategies.
Conclusion
We have argued that thought-action fusion and neutralising, which are central to cognitive models of the
development and maintenance of OCD, are both related to a tendency to think magically. Our data supports a
relationship between neutralising behaviour and a tendency to magical thinking. However, we have shown this
phenomenon occurs in an unselected group of participants, and that those who neutralise are no higher than
others in obsessive-compulsive symptoms.
One interpretation is that we should not think of magical thinking and its consequences as a
stable characteristic that makes people vulnerable to OCD. Rather, it may be a relatively normal phe-
nomenon that arises in speciﬁc situations. As TAF and neutralising occur frequently in OCD, one explanation
might be that they follow from the content of obsessions, which often focus on situations involving
uncontrollable threat. This type of content would tend to elicit magical thinking, which is liable to occur
when we face a threat which is unpredictable, poorly understood, and uncontrollable (Zusne and Jones, 1989).
In OCD it may serve to provide an illusion of control over otherwise uncontrollable events (Bolton et al.,
2002).
The main caveat is that we are not sure that the neutralising seen here is actually an attempt to inﬂuence
future events, rather than simply a means of managing anxiety associated with writing out a threatening
sentence. It is therefore not yet clear that this paradigm is fully modelling the effects seen in OCD, and further
research that focuses on the control of future consequences will be required.
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